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ARTICLES 'All Concept and No Form?’
By
Mark Ramsden and
Becky
Shaw
Appleton rightly points out that the term ‘conceptual art’ is liberally bandied around and stuck on to any piece of modern art but she herself is guilty of this. To give some clarity to the discussion reference must be first made to ‘conceptual art’ as an historical movement, which has been enormously influential on how we think about art’s purpose and methods. Its influence on contemporary work explains the temptation to label so much of it as conceptual. When it is used as a criticism it tends to be on the grounds that a work has insufficient emphasis on form. The historical context of Conceptualism The ‘conceptual art movement’ emerged in the 1960s. It is no coincidence that it should have emerged at a time of widespread radical thinking and a popular desire to challenge institutions and social norms. In particular, it developed out of an intention to challenge the commodification of art, which was typically seen as corrupting and passifying art. By removing the easily saleable object, it was intended that the role of art as a thought provoking tool for change would be emphasised. Conceptual art arose from a desire to critique the production of the art object within reified capitalist social relations, and expose the mystique of genius and skill. By selecting methods that did not involve craft-skill the artists asserted art’s primary role as a communicator of ideas. This presented a challenge to the expectation of visual beauty in art. By using simple forms such as, for example, a hand-written sign, they sought to demonstrate that the physical making of art was not where its ‘skill’ lay. Furthermore, removing the ‘skill’ element was intended as an act of egalitarianism as it was hoped that this would increase arts accessibility to all. Rather than a reduction in commitment to audience, that Appleton depicts, conceptual art was intended to increase the level of engagement expected from an audience, as Tony Godfrey says: "...it could be argued that the conceptual work of art only truly exists in the viewers mental participation." (1998: 4) Appleton says of the 1960s conceptual artists, that "the making of an art object was seen as a perfunctory affair, that could be assigned to assistants or abandoned entirely". This is right but what she misunderstands is that this was a conscious, well-thought out strategy, not laziness as she suggests. By assigning someone else to make their work, as in the example of Sol le Witt, the artist declared that art was about idea not hand-craft. Appleton also follows the notion that conceptual art was without form. While conceptual art chose to challenge conventional ideas of form the work is, of course, not without form. Down to the choice of font in a text by Kosuth, the glass (not plastic cup) chosen by Michel Craig-Martin, or the decision to show nothing in a gallery except the administrator by Michael Asher, the greatest thought is given to the appropriate means through which to communicate. Issues such as timing, media representation and placement become the new language of the form, just as a brush mark is the language of a painting. Form and content Appleton
argues that "...art can never be just an ‘idea’;
art only works when it is a visual experience of some kind".
Apart from ignoring the fact that artists work in sound and other
senses, it represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship
between form and content. Of course conceptual art had to have
forms to carry it, as do writing and speech which have timbre,
grammar, pace, language etc. Appleton compares ‘Guernica’ with Nauman’s ‘Raw War’, suggesting that ‘Guernica’ is more developed and conveys more to the viewer. Firstly, it seems dangerously conservative and teleological to make such crude comparisons between works made in such different contexts. Placing work in its social context is important. For example, would ‘Guernica’ successfully convey the rawness of war to anyone who knew nothing of the Spanish Civil War and Picasso’s involvement in it? Secondly, by suggesting that ‘Guernica’ is a ‘work of art’ while Nauman’s ‘War Raw’ isn’t, Appleton forgets that both of these are works of art because they are intended to inhabit the social construct of the art world. They may be of differing quality, and time but both are works of art. To call something a work of art is not an assessment of its value, it is simply whether it is made for the context of ‘art’. Appleton also measures Nauman’s work with the criteria of beauty and skill. Rather than being too lazy to develop his idea further, Nauman consciously selected his medium to convey something of the slickness and sloganeering that takes place in contemporary media representation of war. In looking for more depth Appleton is missing the point that the work is intended to communicate the surface banality of contemporary life. The medium, in this case, is the message. Joseph Beuys’ work consisting of lectures on Marxian economics is also criticised by Appleton. Appleton asserts that Beuys called the blackboards art but this wasn’t the case. Beuys named the process not the resulting objects, art. The fact that art institutions now guard the blackboards as precious art is a more useful indictment of the failure to prevent commodification of Beuys’ work. However the main problem is that Appleton criticises Beuys for the quality of his Marxian economics. In fact his intention was not to be a Marxist professor but to present the idea that art should be about the bettering of society. Appleton rightly wants an argument with his sloppy politics but this isn’t a good enough criticism of his artistic method. Originality Appleton writes that "what Duchamp did at least had the virtue of being original...". Hence Appleton implies that anyone who today works in a ‘conceptual way’ is unoriginal. Would Appleton criticise the contemporary use of Marxian method on the grounds of it being unoriginal? No, such an act is using a method not re-using a form. In the same way conceptualism is a line of thinking which produces many different forms. Whilst originality may be desired, it is this that is so often responsible for the fetishisation of form and a neglect of content, and the quest for shock. Visit any graduate art show for examples of this. It seems a spurious aim to seek original form for the sake of it rather than developing a continuing dialogue. It is also worth noting that contemporary artists may deliberately seek ‘innovative form’ as a way to critique the market’s thirst for originality. "Conceptual art refuses to be judged in conventional artistic terms, in terms of the material art object" Appleton writes. However, conceptual art is not alone here. Every modern art movement sought to challenge the notion of art of the time. In this sense conceptual art is no different to other art, seeking innovative ways to communicate. Appleton complains that this makes conceptual art hard to judge. Maybe, but there is still good and bad conceptual art. Like any art it should be assessed on the quality of the language with which it communicates it's ideas. Perhaps what Appleton objects to is that she can’t judge the skill of making. Conclusions Appleton criticises conceptual art's elevation of ideas over form. However, she forgets that form is essential to communication, and that "pure ideas" don’t exist except perhaps only in the mind. The problem with conceptualism is not that it seeks the pursuit of ideas but that the artists’ ideas have so often been flawed. Conceptual art’s desire to reveal more than the appearances of things was important- an attempt to communicate that the surface appearance of daily life doesn’t reflect the real relationships that underpin it. Their aim to un-commodify art was also admirable but failed. Instead the market found ways to commodify the physical materials conceptual artists did make use of, such as the documents of performances and texts which now occupy museum collections. In attempting to do away with the beautiful object, they saw the object as the problem rather than the product of reified social relations. The worthy dislike of objects continues into today’s art, as seen in numerous anti-object practices (see Ramsden and Shaw 2003) and very clearly in Michael Landy’s ‘Breakdown’, (Beech, 2001) which also misguidedly tells us that the possession of objects is morally wrong and is responsible for our oppression. Contemporary art has a huge heritage in conceptual art, particularly in its recognition of the significance of context, its critique of institutions and its desire to push the viewer beyond an appreciation of craft skill. However, the majority of contemporary artists would be horrified to have their work described as ‘conceptual’. To use a popular example, Tracy Emin’s bed is not about the radical, Duchampian decision to put a bed in a gallery, but about confession, the depiction of her pain and a diaristic view of her life as a celebrity. These are concerns which are connected to a far more romantic, traditional expressionistic line of inquiry. As Julian Stallabrass (1999) points out, so many contemporary artists labelled as yBas developed their ideas in reaction against their conceptually-orientated peers. Instead they celebrated objects and commodities, and placed emotion and feelings above ideas. Conceptual art represented a movement where the conveying of idea was paramount. Contemporary artists would hate to have their work described as conceptual because in today’s dark ages the conveying of emotions is now considered far more important than ideas. In her condemnation of conceptual art’s loftier aims is Appleton seeking the return to ‘authentic expression’?
Beech, D. (2001) Breakdown by Michael Landy (Review), Art Monthly, 244: 30. Godfrey, T. (1998) Conceptual Art. Phaidon Press Ltd: London. Ramsden, M. and Shaw, B. (2003) Stazione di Topolo: changing the world or escaping it?, Third Text, 17(2): 183-194. Stallabrass,
J. (1999) High Art Lite: British Art in the 1990s. Verso: London.
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